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LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING 
PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AND 
FORCIBLE MEASURES OF 
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE 
UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER AND 
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OLUMIDE K. OBA YEMI* 
When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until 
he has struck before you crush him. - Franklin D. Roosevelt ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the United States had never unilaterally attacked another 
nation militarily prior to its fIrst having been attacked or prior to its citi-
zens or interests fIrst having been attacked. This posture has changed 
permanently. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush of the 
United States announced the expansive "Bush Doctrine," when he de-
clared: 
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. 
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated. Either you are with us or you are 
with the terrorists. I 
* Olumide K. Obayemi is admitted to the Bars of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the State 
of California. He teaches Taxation Law at East Bay Law School, Oakland California. 
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In the same manner, Vice President Dick Cheney declared before the 
National Association of Home Builders on June 6, 2002 thus: 
... we also realize that wars are not won on the defensive. We 
must take the battle to the enemy and, where necessary, preempt 
grave threats to our country before they materialize.2 
On August 26,2002, before the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Con-
vention, Vice President Dick Cheney went on and declared as well that: 
... containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of 
mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists 
who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United 
States.3 
Finally, on March 16,2006, in the National Security Strategy released by 
President George Bush, he reiterated his undying commitment to the 
"Bush Doctrine." He stated that although America faces a choice be-
tween the path of fear and the path of confidence, the path of fear - isola-
tionism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment, Americans must 
always be on the offensive in the war against terror.4 America's resolve 
was restated thus: 
America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy 
required by the grave challenge we face - the rise of terrorism 
fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully re-
vealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This 
strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the secu-
** Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat of Sept. 11, 1941, quoted in DICfIONARY OF MILITARY 
AND N A V AL QUOTATIONS 247 (1966). 
1. See President George Bush's Seminal Speech on Sept. 20, 2001 to the Joint Session of 
Congress, discussed by Carol Devine-Molin in The GOP's Magnificent Convention, on September 2, 
2004, available at <http://www.gopusa.comlcommentary/cmolinl2004/cdm_0902p.shtml> (last 
visited on March 16,2006) [hereinafter "Bush Doctrine"]. The same views were also advocated on 
other occasions: see speeches of President George W. Bush at West Point (June I, 2(02) 
<http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002l06120020601-3.html>; and the President's United 
Nations speech of Sept. 12, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002l09120020912-
l.html>; WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2002, p. AI; WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 13, 2002, p.AI; see 
also, FRANCIS A. BOYLE, WORW POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-167 (1985); FRANCIS A. 
BoYLE, THE FuTuRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 79-112 (1989). 
2. See the speeches of Vice President Dick Cheney before the National Association of Home 
Builders on June 6, 2002 found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresidentlnewsspeeches/ 
speecheslvp20020606.html>. 
'3. The Vice President's speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention on 
August 26, 2002 found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl20020826.html>. 
4. See George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy, dated March 16,2006, available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsdnssl2006/nss2006.pdf> (last visited March 17,2006). 
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rity of the American people. America also has an unprecedented 
opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals 
that have inspired our history - freedom, democracy, and human 
dignity - are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations 
throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward 
peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure. 
These inseparable priorities - fighting and winning the war on 
terror and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and 
despair - have now guided American policy for more than 4 
years. We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks, 
leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated.5 
21 
The thesis of this article argues that while the use of preemptive military 
strikes, now adopted by the United States against non-state actors and 
rogue states, appears to be justified under international law, such a mili-
tary exercise must be subject to well defined and clearly stated interna-
tionallegal rules. 
"Preemptive" use of military force is the taking of military action by the 
United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a pre-
sumed military attack or use of force by that nation against the United 
States.6 There is no doubt that preemptive military strike, also defined as 
the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long 
been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. The 
present concern is whether the rules governing self-defense and preemp-
tive strike as formulated in the late Nineteenth century would still pass 
muster under the highly evolving rules of modem warfare. When these 
rules were initially formulated, most international conflicts were con-
ducted by states utilizing large movements of military personnel and 
ammunitions. 
The question, then, is should an archaic rule requiring that an actual 
armed attack must precede self-defense continue to govern in a comput-
erized age where substantial and catastrophic atrocities can be achieved 
by non-state terrorists and rogue states via hidden and unconventional 
methods? This author's position, using the events of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C., 
as background, argues for an extension and enlargement of the rule of 
5. Id. 
6. See Richard F. Grimmett. U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force. Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Report for Congress. Order Code RS2l311 of Sept. 18. 2002. <http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/iraklIMG/pdf/us_use_oCpreemptivejorce-2.pdf> (last visited March 16. 
2(06). 
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preemptive and anticipatory military strike. The unconventional meth-
ods used by terrorists and their supporters are easily available7 and na-
tions at the receiving end risk being exterminated or at least incapacitated 
by ftrst strikes. All states deserve to exist and should be able to protect 
themselves against a clear and present danger posed by their enemies. 
This is an era of concealed "basement bomb" programs.8 The present 
administration of the United States has indicated its readiness to depart 
from the strictures of outdated rules of international self-defense law that 
have no direct application or relevance to modem violent attacks or 
modem laws.9 While the Bush Doctrine covers nonproliferation efforts, 
missile defense, and other protective measures for thwarting enemies of 
the United States, its main preoccupation, and the most important ele-
ment of the administration's overall approach to U.S. security in the post-
September 11 th environment, centers around ftghting unconventional 
terrorists and rogue states that may be in possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).10 According to President Bush: 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of at-
tack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned 
the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent 
threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and 
air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's ad-
versaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us us-
ing conventional means ... Instead, they rely on acts of terror 
and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weap-
ons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly and used 
without warning. The United States has long maintained the op-
tion of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our na-
tional security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipa-
7. We must note that the Sept. 11,2001 terrorist attacks were carried out by men from afflu-
ent homes who went to aircraft pilot schools, and who hijacked aircraft and turned these aircraft into 
"improvised missiles" with which they struck at the hearts of American economic and political 
bases. 
8. See Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, The New National 
Security Strategy and Preemption, 113 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Pouey BRIEF I, 5 (2002). 
9. Its position is that " ... as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act 
against [such] emerging threats before they are fully formed." See Bush Doctrine supra note I; see 
also, The National Security Strategy of the United. States of America, found at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsclnss.htrnl>. 
10. See Bush Doctrine, supra note I. 
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tory action to defend ourselves, even if the uncertainty remains 
as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or 
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not 
use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should na-
tions use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age 
where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the 
world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot 
remain idle while dangers gather. ll 
23 
The only problem is that the Bush Doctrine and the United States' ver-
sion of preemptive strike is not limited to the traditional definition of 
"preemption" - striking an enemy as it prepares an attack - but also in-
cludes "prevention" - striking an enemy even in the absence of specific 
evidence of a coming attack.12 In the opinion of O'Hanlon, Rice, and 
Steinberg, while commenting on the Bush Doctrine: 
The idea principally appears to be directed at terrorist groups as 
well as extremist or "rogue" nation states; the two are linked, ac-
cording to the strategy, by a combination of "radicalism and 
technology." The administration asserts that deterrence of the 
kind that prevailed during the cold war is unlikely to work with 
respect to rogue states and terrorists - which the administration 
claims are not risk-averse - and which view weapons of mass 
destruction not as weapons of last resort but as weapons of 
choice. 13 
While many states, statesmen, international law jurists, political scien-
tists, commentators, and common citizenry have criticized the United 
States' adoption of an expansive preemptive, anticipatory, and/or preven-
tive military strike in the global fight against terrorism, few appear to 
have a well-rounded grasp of the dangers posed by non-state actors and 
rogue nations to the United States, and as well, to the international com-
munity as a whole.14 
In understanding the historical background of preventive military strike 
practice, we must note that in the past non-state actors (terrorists, guerril-
II. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) available at <http://www.whitehollse.gov/nsc Inss.pdf> (last visited 
Feb. II, 2(02). 
12. See O'Hanlon, et.a\., supra note 8, at 3. 
13. Id. 
14. See generally, Leo Van den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense under International Law, 19 
AM. U. OO'L L. REv. 69 (2003). 
5
Obayemi: Pre-Emptive Strikes and Self-Defense
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
24 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & CaMP. LAW [Vol. xn 
las, drug traffickers, etc.) appeared less threatening to United States' 
national security than the well funded, well organized, and potent anned 
forces of an enemy nation-state. IS However, the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 now illustrate, very candidly, that small groups of non-
state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially avail-
able technology to conduct very destructive attacks over great dis-
tances. 16 Thus, the rationale for expansion of the preemption strike right 
is twofold: (a) to deal with actors who cannot be reliably deterred, and 
(b) to address the enormous threat posed by the spread ofWMDY 
While supporting the expansion of international self-defense practice, the 
superpower invoking the right of self defense, anticipatory attacks, mili-
tary incursions, and/or right of pre-emptive strike as a basis for military 
action against another sovereign nation must bear a very high burden of 
establishing the following elements: 
1. That the nation against which military action is being consid-
ered poses an actual and/or immediate risk to: 
(a) their neighbors, 
(b) internationalpeace,and 
(c) the international community of states; 
2. The nation arguing for military invasion of a failed state must 
have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a judicially cog-
nizable interest which is: 
(a) concrete and particularized and 
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 
3. There must be a causal connection between the actual or im-
minent injury and/or risk alleged and the fact that the second 
state has failed as a nation; and 
15. See Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, Military Aviation: Issues and Options/or 
Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, CRS Report for Congress, dated Jan. 24, 2005, re-
ceived through the CRS Web, Order Code RL32737, available at 
<http://www.fas.orglmanlcrsIRL32737.pdf> (last visited March 15,2006). 
16. [d. at Summary page. 
17. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4. 
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4. The actual or immediate risk of injury posed by failed states 
to (a) their neighbors, (b) international peace, and (c) the interna-
tional community of states would be redress able through foreign 
intervention, either by the United Nations or through an interna-
tional action authorized by the United Nations, before the ex-
treme action of military invasion would be permitted. 
25 
On satisfaction of the above elements, through evidence satisfying the 
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard, the United Nations, or any other 
aggrieved state, may move to initiate military action against non-state 
terrorist fugitives and rogue states. The above additional strictures 
would enhance a cohesive and more inclusive international action against 
terrorists who threaten international peace. In fact, as Christopher Bolk-
com and Kenneth Katzman noted: 
Pursuing objectives against non-state actors while "winning the 
hearts and minds" of local populations, or at least not alienating 
them, appears to be a key consideration. Recent military action 
has killed or captured prominent terrorists, but it is unclear 
whether this action actually degraded the terrorist organization's 
capabilities. In some cases, these actions may have even 
strengthened them. 18 
In this work, Part II discusses self-defense rules under customary interna-
tional law, and the requirement of immanency and proportionality that 
must be met. Part ill discusses self-defense rules under the United Na-
tions (UN) Charter, arguing for an enlarged reading of the "armed at-
tack" requirement and amendment of the Charter. Part N carries out a 
historical account of self-defense military actions by the United States 
and shows that it has always acted justly and peaceably. Part V discusses 
the policy changes in the United States' approach in modern times. Part 
VI discusses the advantage of using of preemptive military strikes. The 
paper concludes in strong support of the Bush Doctrine and argues for an 
expanded use of self-defense rights under customary international law 
and the UN Charter. 
II. THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, INCLUDING PREEMPTNE 
STRIKES AND FORCIBLE MEASURES OF SELF-DEFENSE 
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Clearly, every nation possesses the inherent right of self-defense under 
international law. As David Ackerman aptly stated, "customary interna-
18. See Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, supra note 15, at Summary page. 
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tional law deemed the right to use force and even to go to war to be an 
essential attribute of every state."19 In the same vein, Charles Cheney 
Hyde20 has declared every nation's inherent right to defend itself against 
aggression as, "always l[ying] within the power of a State to endeavor to 
obtain redress for wrongs, or to gain political or other advantages over 
another, not merely by the employment of force, but also by direct re-
course to war."21 In fact, Christianity and Roman Catholicism have al-
ways sanctioned the right of a nation to prosecute war to protect itself 
from aggression.22 According to St Augustine, "a sovereign could wage 
war only when such action was necessary to accomplish the previously 
mentioned objective of building peace through self-defense, punishment 
of evil, or recovery of wrongfully taken possessions."23 Thus, under cus-
tomary international law, a nation faced with aggression from another 
nation may militarily move against the aggressor and face no interna-
tional damnation because: 
An act of self-defense is that form of self-protection which is di-
rected against an aggtessor or contemplated aggressor. No act 
can be so described which is not occasioned by attack or fear of 
attack. When acts of self-preservation on the part of a State are 
strictly acts of self-defense, they are permitted by the law of na-
tions, and are justified on principle, even though they may con-
flict with the ... rights of other states.24 
Closely related to the natural right of self-defense is the natural right of 
preemptive strike (as narrowly distinguished from anticipatory self-
defense) whereby a nation that perceives an imminent strike from an-
other aggressor nation may move, preemptively, to strike at the aggressor 
nation before harm is done. This preemptive right is also clearly recog-
nized under intemationallaw. 
19. David M. Ackennan, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq, 
CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21314, dated April 11, 2003, available at 
<www.usembassy.itlpdfJotherIRS21314.pdf>(last visited March 17,2006). 
20. 3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
BY THE UNITED STATES, 1686 (1945). 
21. Id. 
22. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under 
International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 AVE MARlA L. REv. 65, 67 (2004). 
23. SAINT AUGUSTINE, 4 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 266, 269 (Wilfrid Parsons, 
S.N.D. trans., 1953). 
24. See Hyde supra note 20, at 1-2. 
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To Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, it is "lawful to kill him 
who is preparing to kill. "25 In the same vein, Emmerich de Vattel stated 
the customary preemptive right as: 
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Na-
tion has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon 
it, and to use force ... against the aggressor. It may even antici-
pate the other's design, being careful, however, not to act upon 
vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of be-
coming itself the aggressor.26 
A nation's right to take preemptive strike measures are also sanctioned 
by Christianity and Roman Catholicism since time immemorial, as evi-
denced by Saint Augustine's statement that when motivations, such as 
hatred, bloodlust, vindictiveness, and ambition pose a threat to the com-
mon good, ajust man, acting under the authority of law, could repel them 
by force, so long as he himself refrains from such motivations, because 
necessity requires that a legitimate authority wage war and only with a 
just cause.27 Under Roman Catholicism, warfare is approved of to punish 
evil nations, and even to conquer them, thereby depriving an evil nation 
of its liberty.28 Thus, a just sovereign could deprive that nation of its 
liberty to engage in evi1.29 
However, there are important concerns raised by this formal doctrine of 
preemption.30 First, it undervalues the still important role of deterrence, 
even against so-called rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea.31 Sec-
ond, a sovereign could wage war only when such action was necessary to 
accomplish the previously mentioned objective of building peace through 
self-defense, punishment of evil, or recovery of wrongfully taken posses-
sions.32 Third, it legitimatizes a wider scope for the use of force - pre-
emption without a clear, imminent, and widely accepted threat - that in 
general the United States should discourage.33 Fourth, the nation exerciz-
25. HUOOGROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, 1625. 
26. IV EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 3. 
27. XXII SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUSTEM MANICHAEUM 74-78; see also, XIX SAINT 
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF Goo, ch. 12 (Marcus Dods trans., Modern Library ed., Random House 
1993). 
28. SAINT AUGUSTINE, 3 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 36, 46-47 (Wilfrid Par-
sons, S.N.D. trans., 1953); see also, XXII SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUSTEM MANICHAEUM 74, 
"Any war executed by divine mandate is ajust war." 
29. See Falvey, supra note 22, at 67. 
30. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 5. 
3!. [d. at4. 
32. SAINT AUGUSTINE, 4 Letters, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 266, 269 (Wilfrid Parsons, 
S.N.D. trans., 1953). 
33. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4. 
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ing preemptive measures must undertake an act of war only to promote a 
more just peace.34 
The most widely accepted view on the legitimate use of preemptive mili-
tary force in accordance with international law was best articulated by 
then Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, between 1837 and 1842, in dip-
lomatic correspondence with the British Government.35 Sometime in 
1837, after Canadian rebels had used the American ship Caroline to ship 
soldiers and military supplies from the American side of the border to 
rebels fighting the British rulers on the Canadian side, some British sol-
diers, under the cover of night attacked the American ship while berthed 
on American soil,36 According to David Ackerman, 
[T]he U.S. immediately protested this "extraordinary outrage" 
and demanded an apology and reparations. The dispute dragged 
on for several years before the British conceded that they ought 
to have immediately offered "some explanation and apology."37 
First, the United States recognized that under international law, a nation 
facing imminent aggression from another state may preemptively act to 
protect itself. In the opinion of Secretary Webster, an act of self defense 
would permit an intrusion into the territory of another state only in ex-
ceptional cases.38 Secretary Webster then went on to lay down two im-
portant legal standards that would regulate a nation's right to undertake 
preemptive acts against its aggressors under customary international law 
and be justified only in "cases in which the necessity of that self-defense 
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no mo-
ment for deliberation."39 Secretary Webster had earlier on stated another 
legal requirement in 1841 thus: 
It will be for [Her Majesty's Government] to show, also, that the 
local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the 
moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United 
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, 
34. See XIX SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF Goo, ch. 12 (Marcus Dods trans., Modem Li-
brary ed., Random House 1993). 
35. See letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of August 6, 1842, 
reprinted in II JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); see gener-
ally, David M. Ackerman, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq, CRS 
Report RS21314. 
36. Id. 




Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol12/iss1/3
2006] PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE & SELF-DEFENSE 
justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that 
necessity, and kept clearly within it.40 
29 
From the above, the major requirements for a nation to undertake pre-
emptive military strikes against another nation based upon perceived 
imminent danger, (as different from anticipatory military strike which is, 
on the other hand, based on latent and remote danger) are (a) "timeli-
ness" and (b) "proportionality" of the threat.41 Although used intermit-
tently, the concepts of "anticipatory self defense" and "preemptive 
strike" are two distinct and separate topics in international law. Under 
international law, preemptive military strike is best understood to de-
scribe military action against an imminent attack and such use of force is 
justified under traditional notions of self-defense.42 Similarly, O'Hanlon, 
Rice, and Steinberg defined "Preemptive Military Attack" as the antici-
patory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, which has long 
been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law.43 
"Anticipatory" or "Preventive" self-defense, on the other hand, is used to 
describe the use of force against a more remote, yet significant threat.44 I 
n practical international law, and as known to political scientists, antici-
patory or preventive self-defense may be overt or covert,45 depending on 
the circumstances. 
As stated earlier, the Bush Doctrine has broadened the meaning of "pre-
emptive strike" to encompass "preventive war" as well. Under this defi-
nition, force may be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to 
ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not "gather" or grow 
over time.46 We must note, however, that "preemptive war" or "anticipa-
tory attack" is a far less accepted concept in international law. Even 
though the United States has threatened or utilized it in previous eras and 
in Iraq in 2003, and even though it may be a necessary tool at times,47 the 
situations under which a preemptive attack may be carried out have no 
clearly marked definitions. 
40. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox of April 24, 1841,29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE 
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857), quoted in DAMROSCH, LoRI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2001), at 923. 
41. See Ackerman, supra note 19, at 2. 
42. See Falvey, supra note 22, at 72. 
43. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 1. 
44. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and Pre·emptive Use of Force: Afghani-
stan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 7, 9 (2003). 
45. Covert actions include using monetary rewards, subtle force, espionage and other softer 
contacts to effect regime changes, policy shifts, aid to rebels, assistance and/or logistic supports to 
coup d' hats, and co-opting foreign leaders to accept and adopt United States' political views/goals. 
46. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 4. 
47. [d. 
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In conclusion, while "anticipatory strike" rules may not be subject to 
clear definition and acceptance under contemporary customary interna-
tionallaw because the danger posed may not be imminent, it is clear that 
where a nation feels that it may be subject to recurring interference and 
terrorist attacks by another, it has an inherent right to carry out armed 
reprisals against the offending nations and/or culprits. This is in line 
with the position stated in the proceedings before the United Nations 
Security Council in the aftermath of military strikes on the Libyan cities 
of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986: 
[A] State whose territory or citizens are subjected to continuing 
terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to de-
fend itself against further attacks.48 
The United States' citizens and interests have been targeted by Osama 
bin Laden and/or Saddam Hussein over the last twenty years or so. From 
the United States' interests in Kuwait, and the attempted assassination of 
former President George H.W. Bush, to the incessant attacks on its ser-
vicemen, embassies and diplomatic missions; the attempted Millennium 
terrorist attacks, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, these rogue 
states have shown an uncanny persistence to attack United States. There-
fore the United States is justified in carrying out preemptive attacks 
against these states and terrorists under customary intemationallaw. A 
state whose territory or citizens are subjected to continuing terrorist at-
tacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against 
further attacks.49 
III. THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, INCLUDING RESORT TO 
PREEMPTIVE AND ANTICIPATORY STRIKE UNDER THE 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 
The United Nations Charter was adopted in 1945 and modeled after the 
Covenant of the League of Nations which itself was established in 1919, 
and which was based on the rules of military warfare existing in the latter 
part of the Nineteenth century. Then, international warfare occurred 
between nations, involving the movement of large armies and machinery 
close to the borders where they could be easily observed. Today, in the 
computerized Twenty-first century, warfare can be carried out by the 
mere touch of a button strapped to a minuscule "basement bomb," 
unleashing destructive biological and/or chemical agents. In this age of 
48. U.N. SCOR, 41" Sess., 265th mtg. at 112-13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2655 (1986) (statement of 
Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations). 
49. [d. 
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nuclear weapons, there is virtually no need for the mass movement of 
armies and weapons. Similarly, non-state actors have entered into the 
fray as WMDs have become more accessible. 
Thus, this author takes the position that the narrow provisions of the 
United Nations Charter relating to self defense, preemptive strike and 
anticipatory self-defense must be amended so that impending nuclear 
catastrophes may be averted and so that nations like the United States 
have ample freedom to act decisively against catastrophic terrorist 
strikes. These new rules would be subject to the standards set out in the 
first chapter of this paper. 
The central focus of the United Nations Charter is to ensure that disputes 
are resolved by peaceful means, along with its prohibition on acts of ag-
gression, and its validation of self defense as a justifying principle.50 
Thus, we must note that the Preamble to the Charter provides that the 
United Nations was formed "to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war."51 It is submitted that nothing more would protect the 
world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue states 
than a nation, like the United States, able and willing to act as a police-
man of the world within all legal boundaries. 
In this regard, we must take cognizance of United Nations General As-
sembly Resolution 3314 defining the aggression that forms the basis of 
self-defense as "the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any other State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations 
... "52 Resolution 3314 goes on to indicate that the first use of armed 
force in contravention of the UN Charter is prima facie evidence of an 
act of aggression.53 Clearly, the invasion of Kuwait, the attempted mur-
der of former President George H.W. Bush, and the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks constitute acts of first aggression. 
In addition, it is to be noted that the substantive provision of the Charter, 
Article 2(3), obligates Member States of the UN to "settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means."54 Going on, Article 2(4), makes it 
mandatory that states refrain from the use of force. The Charter also 
50. See Falvey, supra note 22. at 69. 
51. See Preamble to the United Nations Charter. 1945; [1976] Y.B.U.N 1043. [hereinafter UN 
Charter]. 
52. G.A. Res. 3314. U.N. GAOR. 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19. at 143, U.N. Doc. N9619/Corr. I 
(1974). 
53. [d. 
54. See Article 2(3) of the UN Charter. 
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provides that, "all Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations." This prohibition on the use of force 
under the Charter must be tested in light of other relevant provisions. 
For instance, in Article 39, the Security Council is authorized to "deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression" and to "decide what measures shall be taken ... to main-
tain international peace and security."55 Also, Article 42 of the Charter 
authorizes the Security Council to take military enforcement measures in 
conformity with Chapter VII. Further, Article 51 clearly allows lawful 
use of force in the event of an armed attack: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the ex-
ercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council under the pre-
sent Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
It has been noted that, as opposed to the traditional right of states under 
customary international law to use force, the UN Charter created a sys-
tem of "collective security" in which the Security Council is authorized 
to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and to decide what measures shall be taken to main-
tain international peace and security.56 
The next question, flowing from Article 51, pertains to what constitutes 
an "armed attack?" Under the UN Charter, a prerequisite to the exercise 
of the right of self-defense is an act that constitutes an "armed attack."57 
As stated above, Article 51 permits a nation to act in self-defense only in 
the face of perceived danger, i.e., armed attack.58 This "armed attack" 
theory has found acceptance with the International Court of Justice (lCJ) 
55. See Article 39 of the UN Charter. 
56. See Ackennan, supra note 19, at 3. 
57. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: 
Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1989). 
58. See Van den Hole, supra note 14, at 94 (2003); see also Military and Paramilitary Activi· 
ties (Nicar. v. U.S.), 19861C.J. Reports at 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
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which held in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),59 holding that: 
. [F]or one State to use force against another. .. is regarded as law-
ful, by way of exception, only when the wrongful act provoking 
the response was an armed attack... . In the view of the Court, 
under international law in force today -whether customary inter-
national law or that of the United Nations system - States do not 
have a right of "collective" armed response to acts which do not 
constitute an "armed attack."60 
Credible threat and imminent pronouncements are enough, over and 
above armed attacks. The above IC] decision notwithstanding, it is this 
author's position that there would be increased danger in the world if a 
nation's right to mount a self-defense is left to another body, particularly 
when that body may be incapacitated through veto power. As President 
George W. Bush has rightly declared, "the course of this nation does not 
depend on the decisions of others. "61 No nation must surrender its right 
to survival to another body outside its laws. President Bush rightly went 
on to declare the correct position of international law on a nation's right 
to secure its citizens, territory, and interests thus: 
There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of 
many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few. Amer-
ica will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our 
country.62 
The above position has the backing of eminent professors of international 
law. First, there is Professor Myres McDougal who has argued that Arti-
cle 51 must not be taken so literally as to preclude a victim from using 
force in self-defense until it has actually been attacked63 and that Article 
51 should be interpreted to mean that a state might use military force 
when it "regards itself as intolerably threatened by the activities of an-
other."64 In effect, where Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan, and Saddarn 
Hussein continue to restate their desire to cause harm to the American 
59. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), ICJ Reports (1986), 14,392. 
60. [d. para 21l. 
6l. The Course Of This Nation Does Not Depend On The Decisions Of Others'; President 
Bush State of the Union Address, Jan. 28, 2003, available at <http://www.washingtonposl.com!wp-
srv/onpolitics/transcriptslbushtexCOI2803.html> (last visited March 17,2006). 
62. President Bush's State of the Union Address, Jan. 20, 2004, available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2004/01120040120-7.htm!> (last visited on March 17, 
2006). 
63. Proceedings, 57 AM. SOC'Y OF lNT'L L. 165 (1963). 
64. Id. 
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nation and its citizens, such would be sufficient to mount an invasion 
under the standard enunciated by McDougal above. 
Along the same line, Sir Humphrey Waldock asserts that, "it would be a 
travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending state to 
allow its assailant to deliver the fIrst, and perhaps fatal, blow .... To read 
Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first 
strike."65 There is also the view of Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick66 that 
"[t]he prohibitions against the use of force in the Charter are contextual, 
not absolute... . The Charter does not require that people submit to ter-
ror, nor that their neighbors be indifferent to their terrorization."67 Fi-
nally, Colonel Guy B. Roberts68 also supports an unfettered state right to 
act preemptively in the face of open danger: "Whatever interpretation 
one may take, it is undisputed that the practice of most member states 
since the Charter was adopted has been to recognize acts of anticipatory 
self-defense as legitimate."69 
The United States has engaged in "preventive war" or "anticipatory at-
tack" in the past. In 1983, the United States invaded Grenada to effect 
regime change. In 1961, during the "Bay of Pigs invasion," the United 
States attempted to sponsor Cuban dissidents to topple Fidel Castro. 
Similarly, covert operations aimed at limiting Soviet influences,7° have 
been used to effect regime changes in Iran in 1953,71 and in the Congo in 
1961 when Patrice Lumumba was removed for then Colonel Mobutu 
Sese Seko. The use of military force against Iraq in 2003, while contro-
versial within the international community, was justified by the United 
States, the United Kingdom and others, as an action necessary to enforce 
existing U.N. Security Council resolutions that mandated Iraqi disarma-
ment.72 
65. Sir Claude Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individ-
ual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 45, 498 (1952). 
66. Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations. 
67. Ved Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada - Impact on World Order, 
14 CAL. W.OO'L L. J. 395,418 (1984). 
68. Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for En-
forcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. lNT'L 
L. & POL'y 483, 513 (1999). 
69. Id. at 513, (citing MYRES McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD 
PuBLIC ORDER 190 (1961); DEREK W. BOWETI, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 
(1958)). 
70. See O'Hanlon, et. aI., supra note 8, at 4. 
71. Shah Reza Pahlavi was installed instead of Mossadegh. 
72. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. 
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In conclusion, and in arguing for an amendment of the UN Charter, this 
author aligns with the opinion of Thomas Jefferson73 that written laws, 
whether international treaties or domestic laws cannot override a nation's 
right to self-preservation: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the 
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws 
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in 
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scru-
pulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, 
with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them 
with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.74 
If the UN Charter would create and/or permit lawlessness or prevarica-
tion in the face of open danger, the Charter must be amended to permit 
total and efficient prevention of harm from rogue states and terrorists 
who, themselves, have no respect for the law. 
IV. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE 
RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE BY THE UNITED STATES 
History shows that the United States has never been an aggressor. The 
attacks on Pearl Harbor and of September 11, 2001 readily support this 
historical record. With the exception of the Spanish-American War of 
1898, the November 2001 coalition attack on Afghanistan and the March 
2003 Iraqi invasion, the United States has never engaged in a preemptive 
military attack against another nation, save for interventions carried out 
under the Monroe Doctrine.75 
In the latter part of the Nineteenth century extending into the beginning 
of the Twentieth century, the United States carried out several military 
interventions in various American and Caribbean nations in the western 
hemisphere.76 These U.S. military interventions were grounded in the 
view that they would support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed inter-
ference in the western hemisphere by outside nations.77 The Monroe 
73. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 279 (Paul Ford ed., 1898). 
74. [d. 
75. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. 
76. THE MONROE DOCTRINE, SPEECH OF HON. D. C. DEJARNETIE, OF VIRGINIA, IN THE 
CONFEDERATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 30TH, 1865, PENDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
PEACE, available at <http://docsouth.unc.eduldejametldejarnet.html> (last visited March 16,2006). 
77. The doctrine was conceived by its authors, especially John Quincy Adams, as a proclama-
tion by the United States of moral opposition to colonialism, but has subsequently been re-
interpreted in a wide variety of ways, including by President Theodore Roosevelt as a license for the 
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Doctrine, as expressed in 1823, proclaimed the United States' opinion 
that European powers should no longer colonize the Americas or inter-
fere with the affairs of sovereign nations located in the Americas, such as 
the United States, Mexico, and others. In return, the United States 
planned to stay neutral in wars between European powers and in wars 
between a European power and its colonies. If the latter wars were to 
occur in the Americas, the U.S. would view such action as hostile toward 
itself.18 The doctrine was issued by President James Monroe during his 
seventh annual State of the Union address to Congress. It was a defining 
moment in U.S. foreign policy and remained relevant until the end of the 
Cold War.79 
The Monroe policy was driven by the belief that if stable governments 
existed in the Caribbean states and Central America, then it was less 
likely that foreign countries would attempt to protect their nationals or 
their economic interests through use of military force against one or 
more of these nations.80 For instance, there was the 1983 invasion of 
Grenada by the military forces of the United States and several Carib-
bean nations.8! On October 25, 1983, six days after Prime Minister Mau-
rice Bishop was executed by Bernard Coard's Stalinist Sect, the United 
States armed forces landed troops on the beaches of Grenada pursuant to 
the Monroe DoctrineY American troops withdrew in mid-December 
1983, after a bloody battle and the appointment of a new government by 
the governor-general. In all, nineteen U.S. soldiers were killed and 106 
U.S. to practice its own fonn of colonialism (known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doc-
trine). 
78. In Monroe's Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1823, he delivered what we 
have come to call the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially, the United States was infonning the powers of 
the Old World that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization, and that any effort 
to extend European political influence into the New World would be considered by the United States 
"as dangerous to our peace and safety." The United States would not interfere in European wars or 
internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of the affairs of the New World. 
79. See generally, SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1949); DoNALD DOZER, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS MODERN 
SIGNIFICANCE (1965); ERNEST R. MAY, THE MAKING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1975); 
FREDERICK MERK, THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 1843-1849 (1966); 
GRETCHEN MURPHY, HEMISPHERIC IMAGININGS: THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND NARRATNES OF 
U.S. EMPIRE (2005) (examining the cultural context of the doctrine); DEXTER PERKINS, 1-3 THE 
MONROE DOCTRINE 1823-1826 (1927); JOEL S. POETKER, THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1967); 
GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1945-1993 (1994) (arguing that the 
Monroe Doctrine became irrelevant after the end of the Cold War). 
80. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. 
81. This was also known to U.S. forces as "Operation Urgent Fury." 
82. See RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 454 (1990); MARGARET THATCHER, THE 
DOWNING STREET YEARS 327- 331 (1993); Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: the planning 
and execution of joint operations in Grenada, 12 October-2 November 1983, JOINT ELECTRONIC 
LmRARY 62, retrieved Jan. 10, 2006. 
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were injured in the fighting. Cuban and Grenadian losses were reported 
to be approximately 100 dead and 350 wounded.83 
The United States military has always had an important role in peace-
keeping operations throughout Haiti's history-as shown in the two 
cases of the military in peacekeeping operations in Haiti. The United 
States entered and occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 to restore order and 
to secure American national security interests. These interests consisted 
of protecting some American businesses and providing humanitarian 
relief. During this period, the military conducted a massive nation build-
ing effort that provided infrastructure for Haiti, re-established the econ-
omy and supported the Haitian Govemment.84 In 1994, the U.S. military 
also conducted peacekeeping operations in Haiti, this time to promote 
democracy and again provide humanitarian relief.85 
The United States military intervened in the Dominican Republic from 
1916 to 1924 to restore normalcy that threatened to affect neighboring 
states.86 Also in 1912, President Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua requested that 
the United States send its military to quell the political revolt.87 
83. See Operation Urgent Fury, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_ 
UrgencFury> (last visited March 16,2(06). 
84. See The Road to US Intervention in Haiti, available at 
<http://www.cdi.org/admlTranscripts/8021> (last visited March 16, 2006); see also, EMILY GREENE 
BALCH, OCCUPIED HAITI 20 (1969); FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, USES OF FORCE AND WILSONIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 7 (1993); JEAN BAPTISTE DUROSELLE, FROM WILSON TO ROOSEVELT; FOREIGN 
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1913-19, 75 (1963); SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, THE PAPERS OF 
GENERAL SMEDLEY DARLINGTON BUTLER USMC, 1915 - 1918, 154 (1982). 
85. See Major Brent P. Goddard, Military Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti: Should the 
United States military have a role in peacekeeping operations in support of the national security 
strategy?, CSC 1997, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/reportl 
1997/Goddard.htm> (last visited March 16, 2006); see also, That NATO Headache, ECONOMIST, 
July I, 1995, at 3; Sean D. Naylor, Well Done, But Warlike it's Not, NAVY TIMES, March 18, 1996, 
at 1; Eric A. Doerrer, Operation Vignette: Civil Affairs in Haiti, MILITARY REVIEW, Mar.lApr. 
1996, at 2; William Matthews, Haiti Mission Succeeded, Leader Say, AIR FORCE TIMES, March 11, 
1996, at I; Public Lives, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1995, at 1; Elections in Haiti, MACLEAN'S, July 10, 
1995, at 21; Reuter, GOP Team Criticizes Haiti's Vote Turnout, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 8, 
1997, at A12; James F. Dobbins, Assessing the Progress of Haitian Democracy, DISPATCH, Sept. 
25, 1995, at 5; Alexander F. Watson, Support of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Haiti, 
DISPATCH, April 1, 1996, at 3. 
86. See Joseph E Mulligan, Policing the Dominican Republic, FROM THE NATION, March 01, 
1975, available at <http://www.nationarchive.comlSummaries/v220i0008_07.htm> (last visited 
March 16,2(06); see also, LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1900-
1970 (1980); LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE BANANA WARS: UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN THE 
CARffiBEAN, 1898-1934, 160-165 (1988); BRUCE CALDER, THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION: THE 
DoMINICAN REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924, 115 (1984). 
87. JOHN J. TIERNEY, JR., SOMOZAS AND SANDINISTAS: THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Councils for Inter-American Security and for Inter-American Security Edu-
cational Institute. Ed. 1982) (discussing the rise to power of the Sandinistas and current problems 
they pose to the U.S. and Central America); THOMAS W. WALKER, NICARAGUA, THE LAND OF 
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Similarly, covert operations were carried out at various times in the past 
by the para-military and administrative sectors of the United States Gov-
ernment in the face of impending threats. According to Richard F. 
Grimmett: 
Although the use of preemptive force by the United States is 
generally associated with the overt use of U.S. military forces, it 
is important to note that the United States has also utilized "cov-
ert action" by U.S. government personnel in efforts to influence 
political and military outcomes in other nations. The public re-
cord indicates that the United States has used this fonn of inter-
vention to prevent some groups or political figures from gaining 
or maintaining political power to the detriment of U.S. interests 
and those of friendly nations.88 
In this regard, these covert acts are recognized under the laws of the 
United States. For instance, Section 503(e) of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as amended, defines covert action as "[a]n activity or activities 
of the United States Government to influence political, economic or mili-
tary conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." In 
Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, and in the Congo in 1960, covert 
operations were used to change the governments of these countries. 
However, in the case of the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961, whereby 
United States offered logistic, material, and military support to rebels 
that aimed to overthrow Fidel Castro, their efforts failed. The United 
States Government nonetheless received a golden chance to redeem its 
international reputation during the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962. 
In the fall of 1962, unconfirmed reports suggested that the Soviets were 
installing intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba. U sing remote 
sensing imagery, mainly from high flying U-2 airplanes, the United 
States was able to provide incontrovertible proof that the rumors were 
true. The spy-plane photographs showed that the Soviet Union was se-
cretly introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
into Cuba, missiles that could threaten a large portion of the Eastern 
United States.89 President John F. Kennedy was forced to determine if 
the prudent course of action was to use U.S. military air strikes in an 
effort to destroy the missile sites before they became operational, and 
SANDINO (2nd ed. 1982) (chronicling the history of Nicaragua and rise of the FSLN. Profuse with 
leftist rhetoric but providing many useful facts). 
88. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. 
89. [d. at4. 
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before the Soviets or the Cubans became aware that the U.S. knew they 
were being installed.90 
While the military "preemption" option was considered, after ex-
tensive debate among his advisors on the implications of such an 
action, President Kennedy undertook a measured but firm ap-
proach to the crisis that utilized a U.S. military "quarantine" of 
the island of Cuba to prevent further shipments from the Soviet 
Union of military supplies and material for the missile sites, 
while a diplomatic solution was aggressively pursued. United 
States demanded that the Soviets remove these missiles from 
Cuba. The resulting confrontation between Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev and US President John F. Kennedy in October 1962 
brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. This approach 
was successful, and the crisis was peacefully resolved.91 
Thus, during the Cold War, and in major military actions since the Sec-
ond World War, the President has either obtained congressional authori-
zation for use of military force against other nations, in advance of using 
it, or has directed military actions abroad on his own initiative in support 
of multinational operations such as those of the United Nations or of 
mutual security arrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).92 "Yet in all of these varied instances of the use of military 
force by the United States, such military action was a "response," after 
the fact, and was not preemptive in nature, as traditionally defined."93 
The above historical account would suffice to show that the United 
States has not always acted in haste nor has it been a warmonger. If 
faced with a credible threat, it has acted to protect itself, its citizens, its 
90. Id. 
91. Id. See also, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, The Cuban Missile Crisis: President Kennedy's 
Address to the Nation, October 22, 1962, (National Archives and Records Administration 1988); 3 
JOHN FITzGERALD KENNEDY, JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE GREAT CRISES (Timothy NaftaIi, Ernest R. 
May and Philip Zelikow, eds. c2OD1); JOHN FITzGERALD KENNEDY, THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE 
THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, (Ernest R. May and Philip Ze1ikow eds. 
1997); John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Kennedy-Khrushchev Corre-
spondence During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, Department of State Bulletin of No-
vember 19, 1973; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE 
CRISIS (W.W. Norton, 1969); MONTAGUE KERN, PATRICIA W. LEVERING AND RALPH B. LEVERING, 
THE KENNEDY CRISES: THE PREss, THE PREsIDENCY, AND FOREIGN POLICY (c1983); NIKITA 
SERGEEVICH KHRUSHCHEV, KRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TEST AMENT (1974). 
92. See Richard F. Grimmett, supra note 6, at 2. Examples of these actions include participa-
tion in the Korean War, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnian and Kosovo operations in 
the 1990s. 
93. Id. at 3. 
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interests, and its territory. Warfare tactics have changed. The United 
States' foreign policy must change as well. 
V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11,2001 
TERRORISTS A IT ACKS 
Since September 20,2001, the policy of the United States is now to hold 
responsible and subject to military strikes both the terrorists that attack 
United States interests and/or its citizens and the rogue states that harbor 
these terrorists.94 The background to this policy change in favor of an-
ticipatory strikes involves the fact that threats posed by terrorist and 
rogue states are more problematic because they encompass the phe-
nomenon of concealed "basement bomb" programs that U.S. intelligence 
experts cannot easily locate.95 This change in policy paved the way for 
the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and "also sent a clear warning to other 
state sponsors of terrorism" that the United States would act whenever it 
felt threatened.96 
VI. ADV ANT AGES TO THE USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY 
STRIKE THEORY 
If the standards elaborated above were adopted by the United States, and 
every other state insisting on preemptive rights, it follows that a more 
clearly-defined and explicit policy of preemption would emerge under 
customary international law that would reinforce deterrence against ag-
gression and terrorism by putting other countries on notice of the United 
States' seriousness in addressing threats such as the possession of WMDs 
by rogue regimes and non-state actors.97 While there are misgivings 
about the March 2003 military invasion of Iraq, the preemption theory in 
support of this military action has allowed the United States to argue that 
its focus on Iraq is part of a broader security concept and does not repre-
sent preoccupation with a specific regime.98 
Vll. CONCLUSION 
As we have previously argued, nations have inherent rights to protect 
themselves. While a broad-based doctrine of preemption carries serious 
risks, the standards that we have elaborated above are enough to govern 
94. See President George Bush's Seminal Speech on Sept. 20, 2001 to the Joint Session of 
Congress. 
95. See O'Hanlon, et.al., supra note 8, at 5. 
96. [d. at 1 
97. [d. at 2. 
98. [d. 
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the use of preemptive power by all states. To leave nations to use their 
individual subjective standards as a basis for carrying out armed counter-
measures against other sovereign states would be a clear invitation to 
anarchy. Thus, O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly suggested 
thus: 
The Bush administration was right to take a strong stand against 
terrorists and extremist states, but it had already accomplished 
this goal with its early words in the period after the September 
11 attacks and its actions in Afghanistan. It did not need a for-
mal doctrine of preemption to drive the point home. Rather than 
enunciate a formal new doctrine, it would have been better to 
continue to reserve the preemptive military tool for a narrow, 
rare class of situations where inaction poses a credible risk of 
large scale, irreversible harm and where other policy tools offer a 
poor prospect of success. Given that the doctrine has now been 
promulgated, the Bush administration should clarify and limit 
the conditions under which it might be applied.99 
The United States must abide by the rigorous standards set out above that 
are meant to govern the use of preemptive strikes, because today's inter-
national system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate 
war. It has been noted that developing doctrines that lower the threshold 
for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacer-
bate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. loo This is im-
portant as O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly noted: 
... countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly 
towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they al-
ready wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may 
make it harder for the international community in general, and 
the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential 
examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China 
and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is 
the India-Pakistan crisis. WI 
The world must be a safe place to live in. We cannot be ruled by bandits 
and rogue states. There must be law and order not only in the books but 
in enforcement as well. No nation is better suited to enforce interna-
tionallaw than the United States. The Bush Doctrine will stand the test 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 7. 
101. [d. 
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of time and survive. Again, we submit that nothing more would protect 
the world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue 
states than an able and willing nation like the United States, acting as a 
policeman of the world within all legal boundaries. This is the essence of 
the preamble to the United Nations Charter. 
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